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Steven N. Kaplan 
This volume is a collection of six papers that provide in-depth case stud- 
ies  of  a small number of  mergers. These studies were  motivated by  two 
primary factors. First, the existing academic work on merger activity- 
mainly based on large sample studies-has  provided mixed results. Some 
findings are clear while others are inconclusive. In particular, the academic 
literature is  quite mixed  on the effects of  mergers on operating perfor- 
mance, productivity, and efficiency. The National Bureau of  Economic 
Research and the  Sloan Foundation  sponsored the case studies in  this 
volume with the intent of augmenting the existing literature and informing 
future large sample and field-based studies. 
Second,  these  studies  were  undertaken  in  the  midst  of  substantial 
merger activity in the latter half of the 1990s. The dollar volume of merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity has set new records each year since 1995 
(see fig. 1). More significantly, M&A activity in those years has exceeded 
6 percent of total stock market value, approaching the levels of the 1980s 
(see fig. 2). Given the mixed results from previous studies, an additional 
goal  of  this  volume  is  to increase  our  understanding  of  the  current 
merger activity. 
In this introduction, I briefly discuss the existing evidence on mergers 
and acquisitions; summarize the studies in this volume; and, finally, dis- 
cuss the general lessons of these studies. 
Steven N. Kaplan is the Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at 
the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago and a research associate of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Comments from Jeremy Stein, Luigi Zingales, and conference participants were very help- 
ful. This research has been supported by the Sloan Foundation through a grant to the Na- 
tional Bureau of Economic Research. 
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Fig. 1  All acquisition volume (billions of dollars) 
Source: Mergerstat. 
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Fig. 2  All acquisition volume as a percentage of average total stock 
market capitalization 
Source: Mergerstat; author's calculations. 
Existing Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions 
The existing evidence on the effects of mergers and acquisitions on pro- 
ductivity or value comes from two basic types of large sample studies: 
event studies and performance studies.' 
Event studies consider the returns to the shareholders of  targets and 
acquirers in the days before and after an acquisition announcement. These 
studies consistently find that the combined returns to acquirer and target 
stockholders are unequivocally positive. These positive returns imply that 
the market anticipates that acquisitions on average will create value. These 
studies (and reactions) do not, however, provide insight into the sources 
of the value changes in  mergers or whether the  expectations of  value 
changes are ultimately realized. Furthermore, the combined returns cover 
a broad range of responses from very positive to very negative. 
Cross-sectional analyses of event-period returns provide some evidence 
that the broad range of combined announcement-period  returns reflects 
the market's ability to forecast an acquisition's success. For example, both 
1. See Kaplan, Mitchell, and Wruck (chap. 4 in this volume) for a more detailed version 
of this section. Introduction  3 
Mitchell and Lehn (1990) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that there 
is a relation between (1) acquirer and combined returns and (2) the ulti- 
mate outcome of the acquisition. Other studies examine a number of dif- 
ferent determinants of the cross-sectional variation in returns associated 
with acquisitions. (See,  e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 1991. Maloney, 
McCormick, and Mitchell 1993; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny  1990; and 
Servaes 1991 .) These cross-sectional analyses of event-period returns pro- 
vide some understanding of the nature of the market reaction to acquisi- 
tion announcements. They do not, however, examine whether the antici- 
pated value creation or improved productivity materializes. Nor do they 
have a great deal to say about the organizational mechanisms and manage- 
ment practices that drive acquisition success or failure. 
Studies of postmerger performance attempt to measure the longer-term 
implications of mergers and acquisitions using both accounting and stock 
return data. Studies of accounting data fail to find consistent evidence 
of improved performance or productivity gains. (See, eg,  Healy, Palepu, 
and Ruback 1992, and Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987.) Similarly, studies 
that focus on acquirers’ long-term stock performance find mixed results: 
abnormally negative stock returns  after the acquisition (Agrawal, Jaffe, 
and Mandelker 1992), no abnormal returns (Franks, Harris, and Titman 
1991), and negative abnormal returns only for stock mergers (Mitchell and 
Stafford 1996). Like the announcement-period event studies, longer-term 
performance and event studies document substantial cross-sectional vari- 
ation in performance, but do not study the sources of value changes in 
mergers and acquisitions. 
In sum, there are a number of questions that the existing economics and 
finance literature on mergers and acquisitions leaves unanswered. Existing 
work provides mixed results on the average impact of mergers and acquisi- 
tions. More importantly, existing work offers little insight into the determi- 
nants of an acquisition’s success or failure. 
The Studies in This Volume 
The six papers in this volume are in-depth studies of a small number of 
mergers. Most  of  the  papers  study a particular  industry.  Unlike  large 
sample studies, they cannot and do not consider the average effect of  a 
large sample of acquisitions. Instead, they do an excellent  job of analyzing 
the factors that lead to acquisitions and determining which factors ac- 
count for the ultimate success or failure of the acquisition. 
The first two studies focus more on the factors that lead to acquisition. 
In “Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace,” Barro and Cutler 
study the hospital consolidation in the Massachusetts hospital market. 
They find that the consolidation is driven by a large decline in the demand 
for hospital beds over the last several years. That decline, in turn, has been 4  Steven N. Kaplan 
driven by the proliferation of managed care and by  technological change. 
Barro and Cutler find three manifestations of consolidation: (1) merger 
for closure of excess capacity; (2) merger for economies of scale on admin- 
istrative, laboratory and other costs; and (3) merger for network creation 
and greater bargaining power. This paper, then, finds an economic ratio- 
nale for consolidation and suggests that the effects of those consolidations 
have been to increase efficiency. 
In “The Eclipse of the U.S. Tire Industry,” Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales 
study the consolidation in the US. tire industry in the 1980s. This consoli- 
dation primarily consisted of foreign tire manufacturers acquiring U.S.  tire 
manufacturers. The authors consider possible explanations for this activ- 
ity. They argue that the acquisitions were  not driven by  efficiency gains 
through acquisition by  more efficient producers. The authors also reject 
the argument that the acquisitions forced downsizing on U.S. manufactur- 
ers that had overinvested. Instead, the authors argue that the acquisitions 
were motivated by global economies of scale in production, product devel- 
opment, and marketing. 
While the remaining four papers discuss the factors that lead to acquisi- 
tions, they focus more on the outcomes of those acquisitions and the de- 
terminants of those outcomes. 
In “Is the Bank Merger Wave  of  the  1990s Efficient?” Calomiris and 
Karceski study nine bank mergers. They collect detailed data to determine 
if  those nine mergers were successful ex post. The authors conclude that 
the bank mergers they study do create value, for the most part in the ways 
expected by the acquirers ex ante. The stock price reactions to the mergers 
and the value creation are, however, very noisy.  Calomiris and Karceski 
also find that it is possible to obtain revenue gains or synergies via cross- 
selling in addition to those from cost cutting. 
In “A Clinical Exploration of Value Creation and Destruction in Acqui- 
sitions,” Kaplan,  Mitchell, and Wruck study two mergers with extreme 
stock price reactions. They conclude that merger success or failure is  a 
function of initial due diligence or information gathering, postmerger in- 
centives, and organizational design. They also find that traditional mea- 
sures of postmerger operating performance are very noisy measures of the 
actual performance of the merger. 
In “Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of  Value in Mergers,” 
Kole and Lehn study USAir’s acquisition of Piedmont Aviation. The ac- 
quisition turned out to be very unsuccessful. Kole and Lehn find that the 
key stumbling block came in integrating the workforces of the two compa- 
nies. After the acquisition, USAir made the disastrous decision to increase 
the wages at Piedmont (the lower wage firm) rather than do nothing or 
reduce wages  at USAir (the high wage firm). Kole and Lehn also argue 
that part of the reason for the acquisition and its lack of success was that Introduction  5 
the top executives involved cared more about survival than about share- 
holder value. Finally, Kole and Lehn report that the stock market reacted 
very positively to the acquisition when it was announced. As in several of 
the other studies in this volume, that reaction turned out to be wrong. 
In “Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers,” Ravenscraft 
and Long study mergers in the pharmaceutical industry. They argue that 
large  deals involving similar companies-horizontal  deals-create  the 
most value. This value is created from reducing costs in manufacturing, 
marketing and sales, headquarters,  and research and development after 
the merger. 
Conclusions and Generalizations 
The question remains, what can be learned in this volume from the in- 
depth analyses of a small number of mergers that cannot be learned from 
large sample studies. The answer is a great deal.2 
The studies do an excellent job of  discussing the forces that lead to 
mergers and acquisitions. The success here is partially due to the fact that 
most of the studies consider industries. In particular, Barro and Cutler do 
an excellent job of  discussing the reasons for hospital consolidation in 
Massachusetts as do Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales for the acquisitions in 
the US. tire industry. 
The success in identifying these forces is noteworthy because a general 
pattern emerges from these studies. It is striking that most of the mergers 
and acquisitions were associated with technological or regulatory shocks. 
This is true in every industry studied in this volume-the  airline, banking, 
hospital, pharmaceutical,  and tire industries. This pattern supports the 
large sample results of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) that merger activity 
is related to industry shocks. 
At the same time that these studies shed light on the forces that lead to 
mergers, they also provide useful information-to  both academics and 
practitioners-concerning  what  factors influence a merger’s  success or 
failure. Perhaps the most interesting factor, found in several of the studies, 
is the extent to which the acquirer understood the target before the acquisi- 
tion. While this finding seems obvious and commonsensical, the fact that 
acquisitions fail because acquirers do not gain sufficient information on 
the target is important. For practitioners, it provides a strong incentive to 
get information before completing an acquisition. For academics, it pro- 
vides some possible topics for further study. Why do executives undertake 
acquisitions without sufficient information gathering? What is the optimal 
amount of information to gather? 
2. I particularly thank Jeremy Stein for helpful comments here. 6  Steven N. Kaplan 
The studies also suggest some issues that should be of interest to finance 
and organizational theorists. In particular, several of the papers yield in- 
teresting results concerning the boundaries of the firm. For example, the 
Kole  and Lehn  analysis  of  the  USAir-Piedmont  merger  suggests that 
workers respond in substantially different ways to having low wages rela- 
tive to similar workers in the same industry versus having low wages rel- 
ative to similar workers in  the same firm. The analysis of the Cooper- 
Cameron  acquisition  in  Kaplan,  Mitchell,  and  Wruck  suggests  that 
different organizational structures lead to important differences in pro- 
ductivity. 
Finally, the studies should be of methodological interest for those who 
perform  large sample studies. These papers  indicate  that  large sample 
studies-whether  accounting-based or stock-based-cannot  possibly cap- 
ture the richness of the economic effects of mergers. And, with some fre- 
quency, those large sample measures will not even capture the direction of 
the economic effect. 
In summary, then, the studies in this volume do exactly what they are 
supposed to do. They augment and inform the existing literature on merg- 
ers and acquisitions. They also suggest areas for future work-both  large 
sample and small. 
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